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Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth succinctly defines the privi-
lege as a "President's claim of constitutional authority to withhold information
from Congress" (p. 1). Its thesis, simply asserted, is that any such claim
is a constitutional "myth" (p. 1). The book's formidable undertaking is to
demonstrate, purportedly with unequivocal proof, that a President's refusal to
disclose is an unlawful encroachment on Congress' constitutional power of
inquiry into the executive branch. Whether broad or narrow, executive privi-
lege cannot be legitimated by reconciling or balancing competing values or
by "pruning a branch here or there; the axe must be put to the root" (p. 264)
of this unconstitutional practice.
Executive Privilege is monumentally unpersuasive in establishing this
case. The analysis is primarily historical, though functional justifications and
practical accommodations are unsystematically interjected. The interpretation
of early American history, though professing objectivity, is decidedly tilted
and in the wrong direction. Its method of dealing with adverse precedents and
opposing views unwittingly leads Professor Berger to make concessions which
contradict the central propositions of the book. The functional considerations,
primarily concerned with presidential supremacy, are tenuously related to the
actual costs of executive privilege. Finally its recommendation of judicial
remedies misconceives a workable role for courts. I shall consider these weak-
nesses in order.
In understanding Professor Berger's account of history, we may first
consider his claim that constitutional interpretation may only be derived from
the text and the intent of the Framers. Functional considerations, the wisdom
of an allocation, may not influence construction, save where the authoritative
materials are unclear and equivocal (pp. 10-11, 286). Few legal scholars
rely upon this restrictive mode of interpretation ;' nor is it reflected in scores
of Supreme Court adjudications, doubtless because it affords no recognition to
what Justice Brandeis aptly termed "a capacity for adaptation."'2 But we need
not resolve this broader issue, since Professor Berger's historical interpre-
tations are, in fact, wedded to his policy preferences, and the offspring of this
* Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. E.g., C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969);
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 106-10 (1962).
2. A. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 107.
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union is an advocate's version of history. Paradoxically, Berger alerts his
readers to the pervasiveness of such subjectivity in using the past: "Each
generation tends to read history in the focus of its own preoccupations"
(p. 342).
The immediate sources of authority are inconclusive. The Constitution
specifies neither a general legislative power of inquiry nor an executive power
to withhold information. The Framers at the Convention discuss neither of
these powers, save indirectly by references to impeachment, which implies a
power of inquiry into specific wrongdoing (pp. 35-36). The historian must
therefore turn to indirect sources, and here Professor Berger provides a de-
tailed account of Parliamentary inquiries into executive affairs, initially for
impeachment, but later for policing appropriations and, at times, legislation
and foreign affairs. Executive Privilege emphasizes that Parliament tolerated
but one or two instances of withholding, attributable to an extraordinary
diplomatic situation and to a Prime Minister's dominance over Parliament.
Professor Berger concludes that since Congress was "patently modeled" (p.
10) after the Houses of Parliament, their broad inquiry practices provide the
measure of the intended scope of Congress' power.
This is a large and questionable assumption. We do not know whether
the Framers were familiar with the particular incidents of Parliamentary in-
quiry, themselves apparently in flux, or whether they wanted to duplicate
them. But we do know that the Framers understood that the differences be-
tween Congress, with limited and enumerated powers, and Parliament, with
unwritten plenary authority, were as great as their similarities.3 More par-
ticularly, Parliament inquired of "executive" ministers who were themselves
members of Parliament and directly accountable to it, and not of an inde-
pendent President far less accountable to Congress. Correspondingly, the
American executive, unlike the Prime Minister, had no control over the
legislature or its inquiries (p. 26). Yet Executive Privilege appears oblivious
to these patent differences and unconcerned with their import regarding the
intent of the Framers.
Professor Berger notes additionally that the Framers were familiar with
monarchy, royal prerogatives and colonial governors. Therefore, they feared
executive tyranny and favored a Congress with adequate powers to keep the
executive in check (pp. 50-56). This generality obviously sheds little light on
the particular issue of executive privilege. Moreover, it too requires major
qualification: one of the well-known and more immediate dissatisfactions lead-
ing to the Constitutional Convention was the experience of government with-
out a separate executive branch under the Articles of Confederation. The
Convention favored greater centralization of authority in an executive inde-
3. L. FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 22-26 (1972).
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pendent of Congress, with power sufficient to resist "legislative usurpation
and oppression,"'4 which they also feared. A more balanced view of history
would record that the Framers wanted a strong though not unchecked
Presidency.5
The early days of the republic provide more specific evidence of original
intent: Presidents asserted a power to withhold information in limited though
varied circumstances, and Congress, though protesting on some occasions,
acquiesced in and recognized refusals to disclose on others and in general
eschewed any test of legality. Washington, Jefferson, Hamilton and Madison
all endorsed an executive power to withhold information from Congress (pp.
168-69, 174). The treatment of this data in Executive Privilege reveals even
more clearly its tendentious interpretation of history (pp. 167-91).
Specifically, a House inquiry in 1792 into a disastrous Indian expedition
caused Washington to convene his cabinet and to observe that "there might be
papers of so secret a nature, as that they ought not to be given up."0 As
reflected in Jefferson's notes, the cabinet found these papers unobjectionable.
but confirmed an executive discretion to refuse a disclosure that would injure
the public.7 In 1796, Washington denied the House's demand for papers on the
Jay treaty on the ground that it had no authority to participate in treaty-mak-
ing.8 Similarly, Jefferson invoked the public welfare in denying the House infor-
mation on the Burr conspiracy and a similar privilege for state secrets in the
trial of Burr (pp. 179, 189-90). Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged the
claim in ruling against disclosure unless the paper was "essential to the justice
of the case" (p. 191). Madison staunchly defended privilege on the floor of
the House (p. 174) ; Jackson declined a number of requests for information
(pp. 181-82), and Tyler, in denying a House request, referred to judicial
acknowledgements of executive privilege in private litigation (pp. 183-84).
Berger deals with this array of notable actors and precedential events
by drawing fine and often illusory distinctions, by asserting that the proponent
of privilege was simply mistaken, and by unwittingly distorting his own defi-
nition of executive privilege. The interpretation of Washington's cabinet pro-
vides weak precedent because the information was supplied without a formal
communication to Congress of the Cabinet's views on privilege, and the dis-
cussion was found in Jefferson's papers, not the Government's files (pp. 167-
70). Washington later relied on the treaty power, not privilege. The House
had excepted confidential material regarding the Burr affair, and Marshall
4. Statement of John Mercer of Maryland, quwted in L. FIsHER, supra note 3, at
21-22.
5. See generally A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
6. Id. at 16.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 16-17. In observing that the treaty power was vested in the Senate, a smaller
body than the House, Washington stressed the need for confidentiality in diplomatic affairs.
Id. at 17.
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actually rejected the privilege in insisting on production if needed for trial
(pp. 187-94). Madison's was not the majority view (pp. 174-77), and Jackson's
views, asserted years after the Convention, provided "feeble 'precedent' " (pp.
181-82). Tyler merely invoked a judicial analogy against Congress (pp. 183-
85), and so forth. In any event, Washington, Jefferson and others were mistaken
in their views of history and privilege (pp. 169-71, 173).
These attempts at transforming incidents of nondisclosure into false
precedents are not only unpersuasive, but in arguing them, Professor Berger
contradicts his own central thesis. Initially, he defined the privilege to be
inferred simply as a President's claim of constitutional power to withhold
information. But in distinguishing these precedents in part on the basis of the
particular reason a President assigns for withholding information-foir exam-
ple, military secrets, confidentiality, the public welfare, state secrets, or a lack
of power in the House-he unwittingly concedes that some privilege, though
perhaps a narrow one, may indeed be appropriate. We can only understand
Berger's purported distinctions as constitutionally based, since there was no
statutory privilege, and therefore his central argument regarding constitutional
power is undercut to the extent we allow his exceptions.
The clearest example of this confusion in Berger's argument is his ap-
parent acceptance of Tyler's invocation of judicial rules of privilege against
Congress and Marshall's ruling in the Burr trialY These rules endorse a
qualified executive privilege, under which a court weighs the policies behind
nondisclosure against the extent of need for the information.10 Professor
Berger appears unaware that such a qualified privilege cannot be reconciled
with his overall thesis on constitutional power: a constitutional privilege which
must yield on occasion is still a constitutional privilege. Berger's acceptance
of a qualified privilege, which entails weighing the practical policies in a par-
ticular case, is even more mystifying given his emphatic rejection of "prac-
ticality" as material to the recognition of constitutional power (p. 10). At the
least, this apparent approval of a qualified privilege obscures just what execu-
tive privilege Berger seeks to abolish.
This emphasis of Executive Privilege on particularizing cases and estab-
lishing the irrelevance of other matter also derives from its preoccupation with
disparaging recent apologists for an expansive privilege, particularly William
P. Rogers." Professor Berger is reasonably persuasive in refuting their po-
9. Berger's approval is not very qualified. He characterizes Tyler as providing "the
most elaborate and reasoned justification theretofore proffered" for withholding informa-
tion from Congress (pp. 184-85), and accepts Beard's statement that Marshall "had
better opportunities than any student of history or law today to discover the intention of
the framers. . . ." (P. 193.)
10. Litigation between private parties and government agencies often involve such
case-by-case balancing. E.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 38 F.R.D.
57 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 896 (1963).
11. The entire chapter on "Presidential 'Precedents'" is written as a response to a
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lemics, but at a cost to his own thesis. He too easily assumes that if the advo-
cates are wrong, he must be right.
Professor Berger's undue concern with refutation and the accompanying
deluge of detail also may account for his failure to recognize the significance
of early executive-congressional interactions regarding the privilege. The
history of early Presidents and their cabinets affirming both broad legislative
powers of inquiry and authority to withhold information from Congress in
various circumstances, for instance, quite conclusively indicates that there
were problems of executive confidentiality and secrecy in that smaller and sim-
pler society; it correspondingly suggests that the Framers were familiar with
the idea of an executive privilege, though they left its contours to the future.
1 2
At times, Professor Berger's analysis demonstrates a remarkable unwill-
ingness even to air both sides of an argument over historical inference. Execu-
tive Privilege quotes many statements of Congressmen and several committees
favoring the legislative prerogative of inquiry, particularly into suspected
wrongdoing, and on this basis the author concludes that Congress neither
accepted nor recognized privilege as an exception to its plenary investigative
power (pp. 37-48, 174-77, 197-203). He also makes much of a 1789 statute
directing the Secretary of the Treasury to provide information as the House
required. These materials are not without force, but the book fails to note essen-
tial qualifications and matters of greater import, perhaps because they are not
central to the colloquy dominating the analysis. For instance, Presidential
statements about privilege are self-serving, as Berger asserts, but so are similar
statements by Congressmen or Committees. Congress' overall stance on privi-
lege might have been suggested had Berger explored a spectrum of congres-
sional views rather than culling only those which support his position.
The congressional record, including committee reports, appears to reflect
division and debate, with no lack of notable supporters of privilege. Signifi-
cantly, Congress did not once provide an institutional response to presidential
refusals to disclose, either by way of a statute specifying when privilege was
improper or a resolution condemning its assertion on a particular occasion
(pp. 43-45). The 1789 Treasury statute, reflecting a special interest in appro-
priations (seen today in the role of the Comptroller-General), had not been
extended to other important departments, such as War or Foreign Affairs.la
memo endorsed by William P. Rogers when he was Deputy Attorney General (pp. 136-
66). Berger notes that most of his criticisms in this chapter were submitted to Mr. Rogers
shortly before their publication as an article in 1965. Berger finds it significant that the
manuscript was returned without comment, and Mr. Rogers has not subsequently responded
to the arguments (p. 208). There are also several other targets of sustained attack: pp.
60-63, 88-100, 286-97, 352.
12. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 5, at 15-18, 32, 39-41.
13. Berger provides a strained explanation for this differentiation. Hamilton, the
prospective Secretary of the Treasury, drafted a broad reporting requirement allowing
that Department to report to Congress on its own initiative. Congress resisted such an
intrusion and redrafted the provision to require information on request. Foreign Affairs
(Vol. 74.1364
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This pattern of congressional inaction suggests more a recognition than a
rejection of executive privilege; at the least, it provides no strong inference
one way or the other.
Although his argument develops in historical terms, because Professor
Berger is hostile to implied constitutional powers, functional appropriateness
or necessity is at the core of his case against executive privilege. The func-
tional syllogism is roughly this: The powers and responsibilities of Congress,
the national forum of debate, include making the laws which the President
executes, policing administration in the executive branch and informing the
people. These functions cannot be performed without ample and adequate
information, much of which is gathered by the executive branch. Hence the
constitutional allocation of powers and responsibilities requires a plenary
power of inquiry for Congress and an obligation of full disclosure in the
executive (pp. 2-9, 265-81).
The key empirical assumption that any executive privilege would sub-
stantially interfere with the work of Congress is neither 'elaborated nor sup-
ported by a discursive argument that executive functions, such as war, foreign
affairs, executive agreements or commander-in-chief, are ultimately within
congressional authority (pp. 60-162). The extensive argumentation that Presi-
dents have unlawfully usurped these powers in recent years is peripheral to
the subject of privilege. The implication that executive privilege has played a
major role in the erosion of congressional power and responsibility is not only
unsubstantiated but is intuitively very doubtful, to say the least.
Professors Black 14 and Schlesinger 15 have recently argued that despite
the constitutional allocation of powers favoring Congress, the Presidency is
ideally structured for the exercise of authority. It has the advantages of unity,
dispatch, initiative and a national constituency, rendering the office a symbol
of national community in a world of perceived crisis. Congress, on the other
hand, operates with the burdens of fragmented constituencies, local concerns
and bicameralism, leading to avoidance of major responsibility, inaction,
acquiescence and delegation.
Although secrecy may serve an activist President, privilege does not seem
essential and certainly does not account for the growth of presidential power
in recent decades. Professor Berger exaggerates the role of privilege in dis-
abling .Congress, as he describes the secret escalation, deceptive and
misleading statements, optimistic reports and nondisclosure of internal memo-
randa associated with the executive branch during the Vietnam and Cam-
bodian conflicts (pp. 265-82). The troop escalation and the bombing under
had no Hamilton to intrude and hence it did not get a statutory obligation to provide
information (pp. 197-203).
14. Black, The Working Balance of the American Political Departments, 1 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. 13 (1974).
15. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 5, at 208-35.
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Presidents Kennedy and Johnson were accomplished without any invocation
of executive privilege (p. 252). Moreover, as Schlesinger has observed, 16 con-
gressional inaction during the war and other recent foreign involvements can-
not be explained simply by a lack of adequate information on the larger issues,
for much of the necessary information, particularly in the case of Vietnam,
was available in the daily press. Part of the explanation was a lack of congres-
sional will to know stemming from an awareness of the responsibility that
knowledge imposes. Further, the unavailability of privilege does not guarantee
executive candor or integrity in providing information; nor does it ensure
the availability of important documents, such as the Pentagon Papers. since
the Executive may choose not to undertake the considerable research and
preparation of such material without some assurances regarding its use.
17
Paradoxically, Berger's argument against privilege becomes more con-
vincing when he leaves the realm of early history and presidential aggran-
dizement for more mundane illustrations of the costs of withholding information.
Focusing chiefly upon the extravagant privilege raised by the Eisenhower
Administration, which theoretically served to protect communications of all
executive personnel in the interest of a candid exchange of opinions, Berger
describes well how it masked a plethora of waste, inefficiency and maladminis-
tration, such as the Dixon-Yates scandal (pp. 237-39). Not only department
heads but middle-level bureaucrats used the shelter of privilege to avoid expo-
sure and responsibility (pp. 241-44). And many of these events might have
gone undiscovered without breaches or waivers of the privilege (pp. 239-40).
Berger doubtlessly makes a well-detailed practical case here for some control
over nondisclosure, especially in the area of spending, conflict of interest and,
of course, alleged criminal activities.
But practical considerations also include the costs of disclosure, and many
of these, such as individual privacy and national security, Berger merely wishes
away by assuming a well-disciplined and highly responsible Congress, policed
by the courts if necessary. He severely discounts the interest in encouraging
frank inter-executive communications by setting up an extravagant version of
the privilege as a straw man and, upon its rejection, leaping to the broader
rejection of any argument for protecting candid exchange of opinions and
advice among executive employees (pp. 235-36, 254-55). The reasoning he
supplies to support this leap is that aides will always wish to speak out, even
without the benefit of privilege, when they provide correct advice or ascertain
wrongdoing; there are benefits in revealing that the chief ignored sound
counsel. If the aide offers wrong advice, he should be fired, and public policy
is not served by shielding his communication (pp. 241-43). Berger himself
16. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 5, at 372-73.
17. See R. WINTER, JR., WATERGATE AND THE LAW: POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS AND
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 55 (1974).
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seems to recognize that the problem cannot be disposed of quite so simply.
Thus he purports to allow some confidentiality for communications among the
President, Cabinet members and their aides.' 8 As the Supreme Court accepted
in United States v. Nixon 9 as "too plain to require further discussion, '20 the
threat of public dissemination may well temper candor with caution and thereby
impair the consultative and deliberative process. In admitting "an accommo-
dation" for such communications, however, Berger again effectively concedes
the inappropriateness of his own major thesis of "no executive privilege," and
also neglects to discuss the source of the privilege he inferentially accepts,
save offhandedly to note that Congress, the people or the courts can work out
some arrangement (p. 264). Practical recognitions, though acknowledged as
irrelevant, are not without effect.
Professor Berger's most defensible conclusion (in this reviewer's opinion
though not that of others)2 1 is that judicial remedies should be available for
disputes over privilege. Regrettably these proposals are marred by overstating
the appropriate role for courts and by allocating to them the wrong issues for
adjudication. Executive Privilege ignores that most legislative-executive con-
flicts over privileges are settled informally through negotiation, compromise
and compliance. Presidents have generally recognized Congress' power of
inquiry and its consequent entitlement to information from the executive
branch. Congress' informal political powers apparently have been adequate to
induce satisfactory responses on most occasions. Judicial review should not be
viewed as a substitute for this pattern of political accommodation.
22
There are occasions, however, when the President formally stands on
privilege and Congress is left with limited forms of self-help to resolve an
impasse, such as marshalling public opinion, refusing to legislate, appropriate
or confirm, or ultimately proceeding with impeachment. Professor Berger
18. Although insisting that control over any executive privilege must not be in the
executive branch, Berger seems to rely on a notion of inevitability regarding the con-
fidentiality of communications between a President and his immediate aides (pp. 264, 302).
He more grudgingly endorses cabinet secrecy (pp. 214, 235).
19. 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974). This case came down after the publication of this book.
But the Court's opinion, though rejectihg the President's absolute, unqualified claim of
privilege, does not support Mr. Berger's statement of the law. The Court established that
Article II and the separation of powers create a substantial presidential privilege for
communications between high governmental officials and their aides. Such protection,
based on the public interest in candid, objective and blunt opinions in presidential decision-
making, is "fundamental to the operation of government," id. at 3107. A generalized in-
terest in confidentiality, however, may have to yield to other high constitutional functions,
such as due process notions of fairness in criminal trials. Hence a showing of a particular
need for relevant evidence in pending criminal prosecutions would overcome the execu-
tive's interest in nondisclosure. The Court added that greater deference to privilege would
be due where a President relies on a more specific need to protect military, diplomatic
or national security secrets. Id. at 3107-09.
20. Id. at 3106.
21. See R. WINTER, JR., supra note 17, at 53-62 (1974).
22. In referring to the past, Berger at one point seems to acknowledge this pattern
of informal cooperation (pp. 44-45). But he regards it as a part of early history, without
relevance to modern conflicts over privilege and the need for judicial remedies (pp. 304-20).
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concludes that self-help remedies are either ineffective or too costly and this
conclusion, limited to these more formal measures, seems correct. For example,
public opinion is likely to be nonexistent on this issue; legislative retaliation
is politically hazardous because the costs may fall on the public as well as the
President, as reflected in a recent bill defunding the State Department for
failure to disclose information ;23 and impeachment is far too grave. Moreover,
the political hazards to the President are minimal, since he, unlike Congress,
need not do anything and typically his opponent is not the Congress, but a
committee of one House. These perhaps atypical cases of impasse are the ones
in which courts may be an appropriate arbiter, assuming that the issues are
fit for adjudication.
The major problem with Professor Berger's extensive analysis of jus-
ticiability arises from his uncritical assurance that there are well-developed
standards suitable for the adjudication of contests between Congress and the
President over privilege. Failing to recognize that congressional challenges to
privilege raise distinct considerations, Professor Berger finds the appropriate
standards in the precedents dealing with several evidentiary privileges where
courts "weigh" the policies of privilege against a party's showing of a par-
ticular need for the information. This, indeed, is what the Court did in United
States v. Nixon,24 where the nonspecific and undifferentiated claim of confi-
dentiality was rejected upon a finding that the tapes contained material evi-
dence needed for a fair adjudication of a pending criminal case.
But these evidentiary precedents are inapposite, in that Congress' need
for information cannot be assessed in a similar manner. As Professor Winter
has argued,25 Congress' need is relatively nonspecific, general and undifferen-
tiated, and serving one or more purposes, such as promoting partisan politi-
cal objectives, informing or influencing the public, formulating legislation,
or determining whether laws are needed. Some indication of the difficulty
courts encounter in attempting to sort out these purposes is provided by the
many judicial denials of relief to private witnesses alleging improper legis-
lative motive or a purpose to expose.2 6 Similarly, courts cannot determine the
extent of materiality of data to yet unformulated legislation.
These weaknesses of analysis in Executive Privilege invite the reader to
reject the feasibility of judicial remedies. This is unfortunate, since Berger's
arguments from expediency and other considerations persuasively suggest the
appropriateness of judicial intervention. As the history of the privilege itself
suggests, such intervention need not drift in Professor Winter's sea of stan-
23. See A. SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 5, at 395-96.
24. 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974).
25. R. WINTER, JR., supra note 17, at 57-58.
26. E.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) ; Uphaus v. Wyman, 360
U.S. 72 (1959). But cf. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S.
539 (1963).
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dardlessness. This history suggests at the outset a rejection of the now com-
mon practice of lumping the various circumstances in which information has
been withheld under the same heading and treating them all as raising the
same question. Presidents have, with few recent exceptions, invoked privilege
in quite narrow and special circumstances.2 7 If we focus on this reality and
view the question as when the asserted reason for refusing data is legally
sanctioned, a basis for an acceptable, if limited, judicial role emerges. Courts
are not competent to weigh relative needs, but they can define the scope of a
privilege and the occasions and procedures appropriate for its exercise. For
example, they can determine which executive officials and aides are entitled to
rely on the confidentiality of communications; whether members of the White
House staff, particularly those performing functions similar to the Heads of
Departments, enjoy a blanket immunity from testimony or must, like Cabinet
members, assert the privilege more selectively; which categories of infor-
mation are so related to inherent or essential executive functions as to warrant
nondisclosure; what kinds of documents are protected (compare census surveys
with files containing raw unevaluated data on individuals) ; and what kind of
prima facie congressional showing of wrongdoing or malversation will suffice
to overcome any or most assertions of privilege (an area where a need standard
might prove relatively administrable). These issues do not necessarily require
courts to participate in proceedings textually committed to other branches of
government, such as impeachment.
Granted this approach does not provide a comprehensive and completely
tidy solution of all the questions and ambiguities raised by executive privilege
(these are not characteristics of judge-made law generally), Congress is not
likely often to use the courts to resolve disputes over privilege. Indeed, it has
tried only once to invoke judicial assistance, and then only as a last resort after
exhausting all other remedies. 28 As even this precedent suggests, judicial re-
view is not likely to undermine the established pattern of informal political
accommodation in the typical case, since litigation does not usually afford a
prompt remedy and does not eliminate the risk of an adverse precedent for either
party. Conceivably, the availability of review may reinforce political resolutions.
Less speculatively, however, it provides a healthy check against the more
extravagant claims of absolute privilege and thereby diffuses excessive con-
gressional retaliation. Equally importantly, this approach would provide a
beginning for the formulation of law on the subject, an impetus toward the
task of issue definition and the formulation of standards, neither of which have
been seriously attempted in discussions of the subject. As Professor Berger's
book attests, the failure to define and focus upon particular issues creates the
27. See text accompanying notes 6-10 supra.
28. See In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub norm. Nixon v.
Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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erroneous impression that standards cannot be developed. This invites a resort
to absolutes supported by tendentious history, which beclouds analysis and
generates a literature of polemics based on a pro-Congress or pro-President
partisanship.
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